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25 Sept 75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Meeting With Gregg Rushford, HSC Staff

NE DIVISION PARTICIPANTS:

[REDACTED]

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DATE

: 5 September 1975 - 1100-1245

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When [REDACTED] arrived for the interview at 1100, she was introduced to Mr. Rushford by [REDACTED]. Mr. Rushford greeted her warmly and then asked whether she really wanted her superior there. He said she could speak freely and wanted her to know that she was not under oath and that what we were to engage in was merely an informal discussion. She replied that [REDACTED] was not her superior and that this was the first time she had met him. She said she was not afraid to speak to him but would feel more at ease if she knew exactly what we were going to discuss and what was expected of her. She then explained that she preferred [REDACTED] to be present so that she would have a witness to what was said. Mr. Rushford commented that it would be better if superiors were not present because the committee had the impression that employees had been instructed what to say - the presence of superiors would leave a negative impression. [REDACTED] commented that his office was not informed of this and would like to know more about it. Mr. Rushford gave an example of one case the week before when a supervisor tried desperately to be present at the interview of two of his employees but the two did not want him there. The third employee requested that he be present. The first question that the interviewer asked was the employee's name and the supervisor immediately instructed the employee not to answer the question.

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[REDACTED] then commented that she had been on leave and had come especially for the interview that morning. Mr. Rushford said that he could have easily interviewed her the following week and said that there was no reason for her to have to change plans and make a

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special effort to come to it - he hoped that she was not using her leave for this interview. [] commented that she preferred to get the interview over rather than go through the weekend having to face it the following week. She also commented that before the interview started she would like to suggest something that she felt would be more beneficial for all concerned. She explained that he was going to interview one of her NE colleagues in the afternoon and that he would be hearing the same story over again. The war had taken place two years ago and many things had been forgotten in that time. Thus, if both NE officers were present together they would be able to jog each other's memories and the interviewer would be able to get the most complete accounting possible. Mr. Rushford immediately agreed and [] then joined the meeting (she was scheduled to be interviewed at 1430 hours).

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At the time [] joined the meeting, Mr. Rushford remarked "Why you look like normal people", at which point [] commented "How do you expect us to conduct clandestine operations otherwise?" Later on, he elaborated on this point stating that we looked like anyone else walking in the halls and that he had expected all DDOers to be ex-football players. At this point, [] commented that to her knowledge we had only one of these.

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Mr. Rushford stated that we were the first DDOers to be interviewed by him and that to date he had only talked to the analytical side concerning the October 1973 war. It became immediately apparent he was not aware of any DDO reporting about the October 1973 war and in fact did not know what DDO reporting was, how it was obtained, how it was disseminated, how it was researched prior to dissem, to whom it was disseminated and how it was used by the analysts.

About 30 minutes were then devoted to explaining DDO reports ultimately arriving at an understanding of what a [] dissem was. This was essential in our argument to demonstrate that there was excellent reporting alerting the community to the outbreak of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.

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We discussed how the DDO called the analysts' attention to the reporting. This led to the revelation that DDO reports are not communicated directly to the White House; nor does DDO have direct communication with the Watch Committee. Instead, analysts use DDO reports as a basis for items in the PDB and for "Whizzers" prepared by the White House Support Staff. Mr. Rushford queried us about the White House Support Staff and said he was glad to learn of their existence because he wanted to contact them.

We pointed out that not only had the DDO used the most prestigious form of dissemination, but had also, through personal telephone calls to counterparts in State, alerted them to the existence and the importance of the [] and the 1 USIB dissem prepared prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

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We then discussed the point in the IC Post Mortem Review that DDO source descriptions were cryptic. [] then read extracts from the [] to demonstrate that NE had more than adequately identified the source of information so that customers would have a proper feel for the significance of the information. Passages were also read to refute the point in the IC Review that there was no fore-knowledge of an Arab offensive.

Mr. Rushford stated that he had been told that DDO could always produce a report predicting any event. We countered, stating that in this case, we had four reports from an excellent source which should have been given far more credence and weight than any other reporting received at the time. He asked if this would be apparent to him if he had all the reporting for the period available. We said we thought it would be especially apparent if he understood the significance of the different types of dissemination.

In discussing the analytical failure of the intelligence community, we said that we had instances where divisions within the DDO disagreed on the content of a particular report, especially when conflicting reporting was involved. Occasionally this had to be resolved at the division-head level. We tried to impress upon him that it was not the managers who initiated the conflict. Such arguments take place between the working levels and the managers (division heads) usually support their working levels. At this point, Mr. Rushford commented that he was not out to get the "working level" - that he believed the working level was doing its job. [] then launched into a defense of the managers - at least from our viewpoint in NE - stating that our supervisors had always supported our working level types. For example, if we had good information from a reliable source, they would go to bat for us to get the information disseminated, even though there may be arguments from other areas regarding the validity of the information being reported. The case of the [] was cited as an example.

We commented on the efficiency of [] personnel who were here at Headquarters during the time of the October War. We told Mr. Rushford how everyone worked together as a team during the whole period to make sure that information was disseminated in a timely fashion. We explained how [] had organized round-the-clock shifts and how all in all the working level had done an exceptional job in letting the community know what was going on. We said that [] (and DCNE/AO during the war) in particular was responsible for letting [] personnel get their work done by fending off the outsiders. We both expressed our opinion that [] had done a fantastic job and that the crisis situation was much easier to bear day in and day out because of [] Mr. Rushford expressed an interest in talking to [] allowed as how this might not be possible since [] was overseas.

We then discussed the "Anderson leaks" and why this led to very cryptic source descriptions for a period of time. However, these cryptic source descriptions were not in effect for the six months preceding the outbreak of hostilities so analysts were able to get

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a good feel for the source of information. Also, CIA analysts were free to call their DDO counterparts for further background on particular sources - a practice which continues in effect today.

Mr. Rushford remarked that he thought the Anderson leaks were great - particularly the one involving Kissinger's statements on the Indo-Pakistani war because that demonstrated Kissinger's duplicity - i.e., saying one thing in public and another in private. This led into a discussion of how and why unauthorized leaks of classified information affect clandestine operations. We said the Anderson leaks had had a horrendous effect on the conduction of clandestine operations; i.e., how can we explain to our agents/sources that their information is being treated "confidentially" when Kissinger's letters are splashed all over the newspapers. We commented that it was absolutely essential for a diplomat just as it was for us to be able to conduct affairs on a confidential basis without fear of being blown out of the water. Mr. Rushford said it had not occurred to him that there would be problems in collection of information from clandestine sources. He also thought that CIA stations were manned by "at least 50 persons" - a misconception which we readily corrected.

In connection with the Anderson leaks, specifically regarding DDO reports, Mr. Rushford asked if a damage assessment had been prepared. We responded affirmatively. He then asked where it would be and we responded that probably the Office of Security had it since it was a problem that crossed divisions and not just an NE problem. He asked if a damage assessment would be prepared on something like the Agee book and we assured him that it most certainly would be and in fact had been done.

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He asked us if we were aware of a DIA prepared estimate comparing Israeli and Egyptian military capabilities which was deliberately ordered to be rewritten to show only numbers so that the sale of Phantoms to Israel could be justified. We responded we were aware of this specific case but had never seen anything in writing. He then asked where he could get a copy of this DIA estimate. After some discussion, we concluded General Brown, who was then Secretary of the Air Force, would be a good person to contact.

Mr. Rushford seemed surprised that we had read the IC Staff Post Mortem stating that it was very closely held. We responded that because of the Division input, this had been made available to certain Division officers. He said he was going to read the DDO Post Mortem and asked if we had read it. We commented that we had not seen it. We had only seen the NE Division draft which we assumed had been incorporated into the full DDO study.

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Mr. Rushford seemed duly impressed with our statements and several times commented that he probably didn't have to interview anyone else since we had given him the "straight scoop." We had certainly convinced him that DDO/NE had done everything it could to alert the community regarding the outbreak of war.

We believe that we responded fully to his questions and he in no way received the impression that we had been directed as to what to say (which we had not). We are also not certain that he fully understood our comments because of his lack of knowledge and understanding about the intelligence community as a whole, how it interrelates and how DDO reporting fits into the overall picture.

Both [REDACTED] interpreted Mr. Rushford's remarks about the working level to mean that he was investigating the possibility of a cover-up; i.e., that the IC paper had been a whitewash. We repeatedly stated that we believed the conclusion of the IC Post Mortem was true, namely that there had been an analytical failure, but there certainly was no intelligence failure - the reporting was there. Thus, Mr. Rushford's statement toward the end of the interview, to wit: "I believe you two---I really believe you; I don't have to go any further," meant that we had convinced him that the IC Post Mortem was in fact a very objective paper and that DDO/NE had even a stronger case than was readily apparent from reading the Post Mortem alone. Mr. Rushford's statements about believing us implied to [REDACTED] that he had come prepared not to believe us (especially when recalling his earlier statement that he had been told DDO could always produce a report predicting an event). He seemed to have expected a defense based on one report and was in fact surprised to learn there was much more to it. [REDACTED] however, interpreted Mr. Rushford's remark about believing us at face value, i.e., we had convinced him there was no cover-up in the IC Post Mortem.

At the end of the interview, both [REDACTED] volunteered to answer any further questions - provided they were within our particular areas of competence.

